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The major migrant crisis, which has been spreading across Europe for the past 
few years, has also affected Croatia in many ways. A relatively small country in 
South East Europe that lies on two important transport corridors – Pan-European 
Corridor Xa and Vb – happened also to be on two big migratory routes: the West-
ern Balkan route and the Mediterranean route. The consequences thereof have 
been seen in a huge number of migrants who passed over Croatian territory, going 
towards countries in Western Europe, often found hidden in trucks and trains at 
the border crossings towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Hungary.
This paper deals with the question of the impact this phenomenon has made on 
freight transport industry in Croatia (and the entire region of South East Europe), 
by analysing regional trends in irregular migrations of people in connection to 
the introduction of new police security measures (on trucks and trains), and the 
performance of road and rail transport services in these sensitive times.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Unprecedented migrations through Europe in the 2010s could mean for road 
and railway transport the same as terrorism and piracy mean for air and sea 
transport. Arab spring, a surge of war conflicts and/or unfavourable economic 
situation in several countries in the Northern Africa as well as some parts of 
Asia and Middle East, prompted an extraordinary wave of migrations towards 
the Western European countries. Poorly dressed and equipped for the journey, 
millions of desperate men, women and children travelled thousands kilometres 
in order to reach their final destinations, using all possible means to shortcut 
those long cumbersome parts of their journey. Many tried by paying available 
transport providers to get transferred somewhere closer to their final point, and 
many clandestinely entered any available transportation vehicle that was mov-
ing in the desired direction.
The migration that had started in 2010 reached its peak in the 2014-16 pe-
riod, only to decrease after the agreement and closure of the Turkish border2. 
Although less intensive, migrations continue to the present moment. Some of 
the most popular migrant routes go through the territory of Croatia, the young-
est Member State of the EU and a prospective member of the Schengen area. Its 
favourable transport position and intensive flow of land transport on the one 
hand, and huge pressure of irregular migrations on its eastern borders (with 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), which are also the outer EU borders, on 
the other hand, make this contrast an interesting phenomenon.
In this research, we intend to explore the impact of the migrant crisis to land 
freight transport industry in South East Europe, especially in Croatia. Did the 
migrant crisis change police security measures used on trucks and trains on 
border crossing points in combating organised crime? What are these measures 
and how do they interfere with the performance of transport services? Are there 
new security measures introduced within transport industry due to the migrant 
crisis? Furthermore, we wish to explore whether present transport safety meas-
ures can help combating irregular migrations, and if so, in which manner. Fi-
nally, we plan to explore possible links and connection points between irregular 
migrations and crimes of smuggling and trafficking in human beings (the THB) 
in relation to transport industry. We believe transport industry and its services 
along the migratory route are an extremely important tool that can be used to fa-
cilitate the movement of migrants and the clandestine crossing of state borders, 
2 European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (20.9.2018).
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mostly without consent and/or knowledge. We have found no previous research 
conducted on these particular points of interest, which makes this research a 
pioneer one, offering first indications and points for further exploration.
Apart from fundamental scientific and statistical sources, data used as the 
basis for writing this paper have been gathered by an in-field research based 
on the method of unstructured interview. The interviews were held during 
September 2018 with seven people from the railway and road transport sector. 
Among them, there were five key stakeholders within two major railway freight 
transport operators, which held together over 78% of Croatian railway servi-
ces market in 2017.3 Interviews were held with major stakeholders within those 
companies, working at different levels involved with the organisation of railway 
transport on border crossings and solving problems arising therefrom, from the 
CEO and middle management to field engineers. Due to high representation of 
the market share involved in the survey, the results can be deemed statistically 
relevant. As regards the road sector, interviews were held with two drivers, each 
with over 15 years of experience, employed for door-to-door transport by two 
major Croatian logistic companies, who regularly drive trucks on international 
routes, including Croatia and the countries in the region (Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Slovenia, Hungary, Macedonia, and Montenegro). Due to the sam-
ple being small, the results obtained in this part of research can only be deemed 
as an indication, and not decisive conclusions, pending further research. Some 
of the information regarding the equipment at border crossing points (BCPs) 
used by border police was obtained particularly for this research from the Croa-
tian Ministry of the Interior, Police Headquarters, Border Police Administration. 
Due to the sensitive nature of the obtained information, the names of the com-
panies and persons interviewed were omitted in the paper as requested by the 
interlocutors, but are known to the authors.
This paper has been divided into four chapters. The first chapter offers an 
overview of the most important statistical information on Croatia and its geo-
graphical features, general-transport-related information pertinent for the re-
search, and statistics regarding migration, relevant for the topic. The second 
chapter deals with the phenomenon of irregular migrations, smuggling and 
the THB in the region involving Croatian territory, whereas the third chapter 
offers detailed information on links between transport industry and organised 
3 See the Annual Report of the Croatian Regulatory Authority for Network Industries 
(HAKOM), Godišnje izvješće o radu Hrvatske regulatorne agencije za mrežne djelatnosti 
za 2017. godinu, p. 3, available at http://www.sabor.hr/godisnje-izvjesce-o-radu-hrvatske-
regulatorne-0005 (20.9.2018).
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crimes of smuggling and the THB, as well as irregular migrations, providing 
an in-depth study of different transport safety and security measures used to 
combat irregular migrations and smuggling, used at Croatian BCPs on land 
transport vehicles. The fourth chapter explains different ways in which those 
transport and police safety and security measures impact road and railway 
transport industry in the region, together with future challenges related to the 
researched phenomena.
2.  TRANSPORT AND IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS IN CROATIA: 
STATISTICAL BASICS
Croatia is a relatively small country in South East Europe, with a popu-
lation of 4.2 million inhabitants (2016).4 Its territory comprises the land area 
(56,594 km2)5 and a vast sea area consisting of territorial sea and interior seawa-
ters (31,757 km2).6 What is more important with regard to this paper’s topic is 
that this relatively small territory has a very unusual horse-shoe (or croissant) 
shape, which is the reason for the extensive length of land boundaries that Cro-
atia has with the neighbouring countries, counting to 2,370.5 km.7 All bounda-
ries, in the total length of 3,318.58 km8, are linking Croatia with 6 neighbouring 
countries: Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mon-
tenegro, with a total of 173 BCPs, out of which 126 are opened for international 
transport.9 There are 118 road, 25 sea, 15 railway, 4 inland waterways, and 9 air 
BCPs.10 Controlling such a vast land and maritime frontier with 173 BCPs in 
total is an enormous task for Croatia alone, made even more difficult due to the 
configuration of the territory and partial impassability of the green and blue 
4 Hrvatska u brojkama/Croatia in Figures, Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Zagreb, 2017, p. 7.
5 Strategija integriranog upravljanja granicom, Art. 2. Karakteristike granice, Official Ga-
zette of the Republic of Croatia, No. 92/2014 of 28 July 2014. See also: Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics, Statistical Information, Zagreb 2017, p. 7.
6 Ibid.
7 Due to the fact that Croatia has 1,244 islands, its seacoast is 6,278 km long, and the esti-
mated border at sea is 865.7 km. See Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure 
(Ministarstvo mora, prometa i infrastructure), Otoci i priobalje, http://www.mppi.hr/de-
fault.aspx?id=503 (20.9.2018) and Strategija integriranog upravljanja granicom, supra note 
5, p. 12.
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bordering zones. Furthermore, small parts of the frontier with Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Hungary are still mined after the war in the 1990s.11
Although small, Croatia has an important geo-strategic position, with the 
longest part of the EU border with non-EU countries. Practically, non-EU coun-
tries in the region that lie between Greece and the rest of the EU – Serbia, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania – represent the part 
of Europe in which different legal systems and norms apply. This fact becomes 
very important when one has to enforce a strong uniform approach in combating 
challenges presented by organised crime and massive irregular migrations that 
are taking place in the entire region. One of the most important facts to be noted 
in this context is that Croatia lies on two major transport corridors. The first one 
is the (EU) Mediterranean corridor that starts at Gibraltar, in Spanish port of Al-
geciras, and goes through Spain (Madrid-Zaragoza-Sevilla-Valencia-Barcelona), 
France (Perpignan-Marseille/Lyon), and Northern Italy (Torino-Milano-Vero-
na-Padova-Venezia-Ravenna/Trieste) to Slovenia (Koper-Ljubljana) and further 
either directly to Hungary (Budapest) or alternatively through Croatia (Rijeka-
Zagreb) to Hungary (Budapest), ending at the Ukrainian border.12 The Mediter-
ranean corridor is one of the six major TENtec transport corridors in the EU, 
representing the core transport network linking the EU from the North to the 
South, and from the West to the East.13 Positioning Croatia, with its major (sea) 
port of Rijeka and its capital Zagreb at one of those corridors, clearly proves the 
strategic position of Croatia within the EU. The Croatian part of the Mediterrane-
an corridor from Rijeka (through Zagreb) to Hungary equals the Pan-European 
corridor Vb, which has the same route.14 In this discussion, we are going to focus 
especially on the Pan-European corridor Xa due to its importance with respect 
to the problem of irregular migrations, smuggling and human trafficking by the 
means of land transport in Croatia. The corridor Xa runs from Salzburg and Graz 
11 See the map of mined areas in Croatia at: https://i2.wp.com/welcome.cms.hr/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/Minska-polja_Hrvatska.jpg (13.7.2018).
12 Mediterranean Corridor, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/ertms/corridors/med-
iterranean-corridor_en (20.9.2018).
13 See the detailed map of the EU TENtec corridors at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infra-
structure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html (23.7.2018).
14 Pan-European transport corridors have been negotiated at the second Pan-European 
transport conference in March 1994 in Crete, and altered in 1998. They encompass the 
whole of the European continent, whereas the TENtec corridors are an EU project and 
link only the territory of the EU Member States. However, the two networks are mostly 
the same within the EU, and there are incentives to merge the two systems. See: Ilić, M.; 
Orešić, D., Pan-European Transport Corridors and Transport System of Croatia, Hrvatski 
geografski glasnik, Vol. 66 (2004), No. 2, pp. 5-22.
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(Austria) through Ljubljana and Maribor (Slovenia), over Zagreb (Croatia) and 
Belgrade (Serbia) to Thessaloniki (Greece), and uses the shortest and geographi-
cally most advantageous route for linking Central and South East Europe, since 
it goes through the plains of the Pannonia valley in a length of 2,300 km.15
Considering the issue of combating organised crime and irregular migra-
tions, one has to bear in mind several other pertinent facts. Croatia is one of the 
most popular tourist destinations in the Mediterranean, with a constant growth 
in this segment of its economy16, which also contributes to the high figures in 
passenger transport. On the other hand, a very large community of immigrants 
from Turkey, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are living and 
working in the Western European countries, mostly Germany and Austria. They 
regularly commute by road in the winter and summer seasons through the Xth 
corridor, contributing thereby even more to the high figures in passenger trans-
port in Croatia, and putting pressure on Croatian eastern and western land bor-
der crossings. The statistics of passenger transport by mode in Croatia state that 
passenger transport in Croatia in 2017 encountered for 85,829,000 passengers in 
total, whereas more than a half of it was operated through road transport (49,561 
passengers).17 It was an actual increase from the previous year (2016), where total 
passenger transport encountered 86,792,000 passengers (which included a large 
number of transit passengers, i.e. migrants as well)18, continuing the ongoing 
trend of a steady growth of passenger transport in Croatia through the years.19
If we look at the road cross-border traffic by directions, it becomes obvious 
that the majority of the passenger transport is located at the Croatian-Slovenian 
15 This corridor has been added to this network at the third Pan-European Transport Con-
ference held in Helsinki 1997, after the end of the war in Croatia in the 1990s. Ibid., p. 8.
16 In the past six years, the number of nights spent in tourist accommodation rose from 60.4 
million (2011) to 78 million (2016). See Rašić Bakarić, I., Sektorske analize, November 2017, 
No. 57, at https://www.eizg.hr/userdocsimages/publikacije/serijske-publikacije/sektorske-
analize/SA_turizam_studeni-2017.pdf (20.9.2018). Croatia is the EU Member with the 
highest ratio of travel receipts to GDP (18.6 %). See Eurostat, Tourism statistics, at https://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Tourism_statistics#Tourism_
expenditure:_highest_spending_by_German_residents (20.9.2018).
17 Državni zavod za statistiku (Croatian Bureau of Statistics), Prijevoz putnika i putnički 
kilometri (Transport of Passengers and Passenger-Kilometres), tab. 5.2.1.
18 Croatia in Figures, supra note 4, p. 25. According to some reports, 800.000 people passed 
through Croatia during ‘’migrant crisis’’ See Sisgoreo, T., Refugee Crisis in Croatia – Re-
port, June 2016,  https://www.borderlineeurope.de/sites/default/files/background/Refu-
gee%20Crisis%20in%20Croatia%20Report.pdf.
19 In 2013, there were 93,139,000 passengers; in 2014, 90,815,000; and in 2015, 88,810,000 pas-
sengers. See: Croatia in Figures, supra note 4, p. 25 (Transport of Passengers and Goods).
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border (ca 40 million out of the total of ca 76 million), followed by 24.7 million 
at the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian border.20 We may conclude that the 
major axis for the entry and exit of passengers in Croatia is situated between the 
Slovenian border at the western, and multiple land border crossings with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at the eastern and south-eastern end of Croatia.  
The major influx of immigrants in the period 2014-2016 went through six 
corridors (see Figure 1 infra)21, two of which included Croatian territory: the 
Western Balkan route that is largely following the Xth transport corridor (from 
Serbia via eastern Croatian border through the northern part of Croatian territory 
towards Slovenia), and the Eastern Mediterranean route going from Greece 
through the southern part of the Balkans (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina) towards the eastern and southern borders of 
Croatia (mainly with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro). At the peak 
of irregular migrations towards the EU in 2015, there were 1,822,177 detections 
of irregular border crossings.22 In the same year, 885,386 irregular entries were 
detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route, whereas 764,038 were recorded on 
the Western Balkan route.23
In the end, when we put all these figures in the context of combating organ-
ised crime and irregular migrations, it is also very important to look at the sta-
tistics regarding freight transport. This is due to the fact there is intense freight 
transport going through Croatia, where in 2016, 72.5 million tons of goods were 
carried by road, compared to 20.9 million tons carried by sea and 10 million tons 
carried by railway. Clearly, a part of the transport corridor routes going through 
Croatia represent vital bloodlines for freight transport and economy in general 
for many countries in the region of South East Europe and further eastwards. 
Any disruption in performance of transport in this sensitive part, where the EU 
borders are indeed meeting non-EU countries, though the area itself has not yet 
been included in the Schengen area, can be extremely harmful in many ways.
20 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Tab. 5.7. Road Cross-Border Traffic of Passenger Motor Ve-
hicles and Passengers, by Directions, 2016.
21 These corridors were named geographically: the Western, Central and Eastern Mediter-
ranean route, the Western Balkan route, the Black Sea route, and the Eastern Borders 
route.
22 Risk Analysis for 2017, Frontex Rn 2133/2017, Warsaw, February 2017, p. 16.
23 ‘’Number of illegal border-crossings between border crossing points (BCPs) to the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in 2015-17, by route’’, www.statista.com/statistics/454910/illegal-border-
crossing-between-bcps-to-the-eu/ (5.8.2018) and ‘’Detections of illegal border-crossing 
and the EU’s external borders 2017’’, Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, Warsaw, p. 18.
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Figure 1: Detections of irregular border crossing and the EU’s external borders, 2017. 
Source: Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, Warsaw, February 2018, p. 18.
3.  IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS, TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING – 
REGIONAL TRENDS
Croatian geo-strategic position on the two major transport corridors in 
South East Europe unfortunately also conditions its positioning on the so-called 
Balkan route of the organised crime. The Balkan route is a largely used term 
in connection to all forms of organised crime taking place in, or through, the 
states situated in the Balkans and in South East Europe: trafficking of drugs, 
weapons, and human beings, smuggling illegal migrants, cigarettes, etc.24 Croa-
tia is strongly exposed to the Balkan route, since three of its eastern neighbours: 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, lie on the same route as well. 
Practically, Croatia’s eastern border (as well as the Adriatic Sea) with its entire 
length is a potential point of risk for the illegal traffic and criminal activities.
24 For the purpose of this text, we will use the term smuggling when referring to organisa-
tion of irregular migrations of people. When referring to other types of smuggling, e.g. 
tobacco smuggling, we will explicitly name it.
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Unfortunately, there already exist well-established criminal networks work-
ing through the Balkan route, which are connected to different forms of organ-
ised crime. Although the major focus of this paper is on smuggling and irregular 
migrations, those crimes are closely linked to drug trafficking and other forms 
of organised crime, which makes it important for us to look at the wider picture 
and some important facts linking different forms of organised crime before fo-
cusing in more detail on the crimes of smuggling and the THB.
There is a long history of intensive drug trafficking on the Balkan route, 
which remains a key corridor for heroin entry into the EU, whereas the overall 
quantity of Afghan heroin smuggled to Western and Central Europe through 
all routes is estimated at 80 tons.25 As regards cocaine, approximately 125 tons 
worth 27 billion EUR are consumed each year, and the drug is being smuggled 
through transatlantic routes within shipping containers and concealed com-
partments on various types of vessels.26 There is, therefore, a strong connection 
between drug trafficking and transport by all modes, since containers are used 
for intermodal transport, i.e. transport with different modes of transport. Can-
nabis is largely produced in Albania and other South East European states, and 
exported to Western and Central Europe via the Adriatic Sea by speedboats and 
ferries from Albanian ports and land routes through other countries, including 
Croatia.27 It is therefore safe to conclude that there are strong networks of organ-
ised crime groups operating on the Balkan route, Croatia included, which can 
easily diversify their business by entering the smuggling and the THB market. 
After the drug trafficking market had become saturated with more organisa-
tions (criminal and terrorist) entering the business, the need to diversify their 
business emerged, and the THB and smuggling were a logical choice for many 
reasons.28 The entry costs from the drug trafficking to the THB market are low, 
since one business can be hidden within the other, the logistics and operational 
networks are already in place and there is often an economy of scale29 (trafficked 
victims are used as human mules for smuggling drugs, ‘’madams’’ running 
brothels can be used for controlling victims of the THB that have been turned 
25 UNODC, Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan route, avail-
able at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/IFF_report_2015_fi-
nal_web.pdf (22.9.2018).
26 Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, supra note 23, p. 32.
27 Ibid.
28 Shelley, L., The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective, Euro-
pean Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, vol. 18 (2012), Issue 3, p. 242.
29 Ibid, p. 242.
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into prostitutes, etc.). Finally, there is a lesser risk with respect to criminal pro-
secution involved in the THB, since the penalties for it are in the majority of 
countries lower than those for drug trafficking.30,31
Evidently, there was a high demand for the THB and smuggling from both 
source and recipient countries in the last period, and the convergence of drug 
trafficking crimes to the THB and smuggling by criminal cartels was a logical 
consequence.32 We have to conclude that the discussion on the impact of the 
THB and smuggling on transport and its security measures in Croatia needs to 
be seen within the wider picture, including other tendencies of organised crime 
in the region, primarily that of drug trafficking. As Shelley points out, Turkish 
and Balkan groups serve as logistics experts, whereas both groups move drugs 
and people along the Balkan route that connects Asia with Western Europe.33 
We have therefore had an already established business of drug trafficking go-
ing on for decades through Croatia as part of the Balkan route. There was also 
a strong convergence of this crime into the THB and smuggling during the last 
decade; this was extremely favoured by the unprecedented migration from Asia 
and Africa from 2010 on. The question is where the link between the huge wave 
of irregular migrations that have been going through Croatia in the last years 
and smuggling and the THB is, and whether and in which manner this trend 
has an impact on transport industry in Croatia.
The process of the so-called Arab Spring, as a series of violent and non-
violent political actions and riots against the established dictatorships and to-
talitarian regimes in many African countries, started at the end of 2010 and con-
tinued at the beginning of 2011. They led to fierce wars in the region of Northern 
Africa (Libya, Syria) and started the biggest migrations seen since World War II 
30 Aronowitz, A., Human Trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human Be-
ings, Westport, Ct. And London: Praeger, cit. acc. to: Shelley, supra note 28. The focus of 
state prosecution on drug related crimes with respect to those of the THB can be easily 
proved on the Croatian case, where in 2016 only 7 persons were convicted for the crime 
of the THB (see Art. 106. par. 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, Of-
ficial Gazette, no. 125/11, 144/12, 56/15, 61/15, 101/17) compared to 1290 persons convicted 
for drug related crimes (those include unauthorized production and circulating of drugs 
(Art. 190 of the Croatian Criminal Code) and allowing consumption of drugs (Art. 191 of 
the Croatian Criminal Code). See Croatian Bureau of Statistics: 1605 Adult Perpetrators 
of Criminal Offences, Reports, Accusations and Convictions, 2016, Zagreb 2017, p. 20 and 
72.
31 The same trend is reported also for other countries all over the world. See: Shelley, supra 
note 28, p. 242.
32 Aronowitz, cit. Acc. to Shelley, supra note 28, p. 242.
33 Ibid, p. 248.
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towards the Western European countries.34 The wars and harsh economic situa-
tion in many other Asian and African countries (Eritrea, Nigeria, Afghanistan, 
Iraq Iran, etc.) pushed people from these countries towards irregular migra-
tions, creating an unprecedented flow of migrants and pressure at the southern 
and eastern EU borders.35 As mentioned earlier, the major influx of immigrants 
went through several corridors, two of which included Croatian territory: the 
Western Balkan route and the Eastern Mediterranean route.
In 2015, at the beginning of the migrant crisis, Europe was outraged when 71 
dead body of Syrian migrants (59 men, 8 women and 4 children) were found in 
a 7.5-ton truck at the Austrian highway.36 They died of suffocation during their 
voyage through Hungary, where they entered via Serbia. Seven people were 
detained and charged with the crime of smuggling and other illegal acts. It was 
reported that in this period, Serbian and Bulgarian drivers were known to have 
been entering Hungary with empty trucks and collecting migrants several kilo-
metres from the border in order to transport them further towards the Western 
European countries. The money paid for these services ranged between several 
hundred and several thousand Euros. In this period, in the course of only one 
month – August, Hungarian police arrested 30 people, seized 16 vehicles and 
found 112 illegal migrants in them.37 Very soon, Hungary closed its green and 
blue borders with Serbia completely, so the migration flow was diverted south-
wards, towards Croatia. Obviously, the enormous wave of migrations from the 
East and the South very soon started to intertwine and provoke the growth of 
the smuggling market.
It is well known that it is extremely difficult to differentiate the crime of 
smuggling from the one of human trafficking at this stage of migration pro-
34 Lehmann, J.-P., Refugees And Migrants: Europe’s Past History And Future Challenge 
(Forbes), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jplehmann/2015/09/02/refugees-migrants-europes-
past-history-and-future-challenge/#3f97fe56a7d4 (22.9.2018).
35 More on those trends see: Nikač, Ž.; Božić, V., Suzbijanje kaznenih djela ilegalnih migra-
cija na području regija s posebnim osvrtom na Republiku Hrvatsku i Republiku Srbiju, 
Pravna riječ, vol. XIII, no. 48, 2016, pp. 193-219.
36 Harding, L., Hungarian police arrest driver of lorry that had 71 dead migrants inside 
(The Guardian), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/28/more-than-70-dead-
austria-migrant-truck-tragedy (22.9.2018).
37 Blic - Milićević, I.; Radisavljević, D. for Telegraf.rs, UŽASNI DETALJI ISTRAGE: Migranti 
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cess.38 Hence, all three have to be observed together as part of the same pro-
cess, which is strongly linked to transport industry. In the following years, the 
numbers referring to migrations decreased steeply, mainly due to the EU-Turkey 
agreement that came into force in March 2016, in which Turkey agreed to se-
cure its maritime and land borders, and accept the return of irregular migrants 
from Greece.39 This discouraged migrants from taking the Eastern Mediterra-
nean route for their passage, and, together with other security measures taken 
at the borders of countries along the Western Balkan route, led to a significant 
decrease in the number of irregular border crossings on those routes.40 In 2016, 
511,046 irregular migrations were detected, which is approximately a 70%-de-
crease in comparison with the previous year.41 In 2017, the overall number fell 
to 204,718, a 60%-decrease compared to the previous year.42 This decrease was 
largely due to the lower number of detections on the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Western Balkan routes (see Figure 1 supra), where the decrease in numbers 
between 2015 and 2017 was drastic. 
The detected irregular border crossings at the EU external border took place 
mostly at Serbian borders, where many migrants stranded there made several 
attempts to cross to the neighbouring countries.43 This put Croatia in a very vul-
nerable position regarding irregular migrations, since all migrants taking both 
the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes have to cross its territory 
in order to reach the Western European states, their usual final destinations. The 
pressure can easily be highlighted by the fact that in less than four months of 
2015, in a country with the overall population of roughly 4.2 million inhabitants, 
559,761 migrants entered its territory44, creating a major humanitarian and secu-
38 Desperate Journeys: January 2017-March 2018, UNHCR, March 2018, p. 13 (hereinafter: 
UNHCR Desperate Journeys), Report available at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/des-
perate-journeys-january-2017-march-2018 (20.9.2018). For definitions (and delineation) of 
smuggling and human trafficking see Božić, V., Krijumčarenje ljudi i trgovanje ljudima u 
hrvatskom kaznenom zakonodavstvu i sudskoj praksi (analiza stanja de lege lata uz pri-
jedloge de lege ferenda) / Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Croatian Criminal Legisla-
tion and Jurisprudence (analysis of the situation de lege lata with proposals de lege ferenda), 
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, v. 36 (2015), no. 2, pp. 847 and 853.
39 See supra note 2.
40 Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2017, supra note 22, p. 8.
41 See Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, supra note 23, p. 18 (‘’Detections of illegal border-
crossing and the EU’s external borders, 2017’’).
42 Ibid.
43 Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, supra note 23, p. 19.
44 MUP RH: Godišnje izvješće o radu za 2015. godinu, Zagreb, June 2016, p. 58. Cit. Acc. to: 
Nikač, Božić, supra note 35, p. 205.
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rity problem. There is the question whether these are the real numbers of people 
illegally migrating through this region, having in mind that there are also the 
dark numbers that should be taken into account. The UNHCR reports in 2018 
that ‘’…(o)f those crossing the Balkans where numbers of arrivals are difficult 
to record as most try to cross borders undetected, the implementation of new 
detention measures by Hungary combined with its existing border restrictions 
contributed to increased numbers of refugees and migrants resorting to differ-
ent routes (…).45 While many still tried to cross to Hungary, others sought to 
move on irregularly from Serbia via Croatia as well as at times through Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to Croatia in the latter part of the year.’’46 In the same report, 
the UNHCR clearly establishes a link between the irregular migrations through 
the Western Balkans with the crimes of smuggling and the THB when stating 
that ‘’…(i)n 2017, many refugees and migrants reported suffering abuses at the 
hands of traffickers, smugglers or armed groups along various routes to Europe.
(…) Amongst those travelling from Turkey and through the Balkans, there were 
several reports of groups being held against their will and mistreated by smug-
glers seeking additional fees above what was previously agreed. Women and 
girls, as well as some men and boys, faced particular risks of sexual and gen-
der-based violence (SGBV) along routes to Europe as well as in some locations 
within Europe. Along routes to Greece, the risk of SGBV during the journey was 
relatively high, especially for women travelling on their own and unaccompa-
nied children. While SGBV is in general highly under-reported, more than 300 
SGBV incidents that occurred during the journey from their country of origin 
were reported to UNHCR Greece in 2017, including a high rate of rape, sexual 
assault and trafficking.’’47
Clearly, the modern trends of smuggling and the THB in the Western Bal-
kans are closely interrelated to the flows of irregular migrations, and the data 
and trends on these crimes has to be extracted from the relevant information 
regarding migrations. In other words, these phenomena form today a part of the 
same discussion. Unfortunately, it has been seen in many cases how illegal mi-
grants became victims of smugglers or traffickers. The line between the last two 
is extremely thin; it is hard to know if a person was ‘’only’’ smuggled or whether 
the smuggler undertook any actions that might characterise him as a trafficker.48
45 UNHCR Desperate Journeys, supra note 38.
46 Ibid, p. 9.
47 Ibid, p. 13.
48 Both of those criminal acts are subject to the United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime (United Nations, 15 November 2000, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, 
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However, there is another very important issue that needs to be highlighted. 
Although the indicators of irregular migration through the EU territory seem to 
be in significant decline in 2017, the data concerning the asylum seekers cast a 
dark cloud over this picture. According to Frontex, the asylum data from those 
Member States of the EU reached by migrants that have previously crossed the 
Western Balkan countries, point to a continuing secondary (undetected) flow 
through the region. For example, in 2017, as much as 78,000 Afghan, Iraqi and 
Pakistani nationals applied for an asylum in the EU Member States, yet only 
13,800 of them had been previously detected entering the EU through the East-
ern Mediterranean route and 8,700 using the Western Balkan route.49 How could 
have the rest of them, roughly 55,000, reached the EU states undetected? Clan-
destine entries and movements through the state borders along the Western Bal-
kan route are obviously extensive. Where did the system leak? Does this have 
anything to do with the usual flow of transport by road and railway, and if so, 
in what manner?
4. WHAT IMPACT DO IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS HAVE ON LAND  
TRANSPORT IN CROATIA?
With the outbreak of the migration crisis along the Balkan and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes as of 2015 onwards, transport industry and its vehicles 
became a very attractive means for clandestine border crossing for illegal mi-
grants, whereas the operator and/or the driver of the vehicle remains oblivious 
to this activity until the migrants are discovered hidden within the cargo or 
the container, in truck or train wagon. What is commonly known in maritime 
and aviation industry as stowaways50 is now spreading and becoming a trend 
p. 209) and Protocols thereto (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, especially Women and Children, and Protocol against the Smuggling of Mi-
grants by Land, Sea and Air). Under the latter Protocol, smuggling of migrants means 
the ‘’procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident’’ (Art. 3a), while the trafficking in persons, under the 
former protocol, means ‘’the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt 
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giv-
ing or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation (…)’’. 
49 These nationals migrate through Turkey, therefore using only those routes for irregular 
migrations. Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, supra note 23, p. 28.
50 See Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne, Smuggling of Illegal Migrants by Air – Air Carrier Li-
ability (2000) 25 Air and Space Law, vol. 25 (2000), Issue 4/5, pp. 148-158.
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primarily in road and railway transport. This fact has created a strong link be-
tween irregular migration, smuggling and possibly the THB on the one hand, 
and transport industry, which had not existed (or not to this extent) before, on 
the other. Clandestine entries by trucks or trains via BCPs along the Balkan 
route rose considerably during 2017, after significant manpower and technical 
resources were engaged to better monitor the so-called green and blue border 
(woods and rivers) between Croatia and its neighbouring countries, particularly 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The previously unusual method of enter-
ing the country illegally – using regular BCPs – became the preferred method. 
Obviously, the control of the green and blue Croatian border became far more 
efficient, steering the major migrant flows towards regular transport routes and 
putting the land transport under a great risk and police scrutiny, with unfore-
seeable economic consequences.51
From 2009 to 2017, the number of clandestine entries at BCPs detected in 
the EU had increased by 85%. With only 296 in 2009; it rose steeply to 3,052 in 
2014; reached its peak of 4,201 in 2015; only to decrease to 2,219 in 2016; and fi-
nally to 1,618 in 2017.52 The steep decline in clandestine entries from Turkey to 
Bulgaria from 2015 on was due to the closed green-blue Hungarian border with 
Serbia (fence), which created a diversion of migrants to the Balkan route and the 
Serbian-Croatian border, where the number of detected clandestine entries rose 
significantly.53 According to the report of Croatian customs authorities, in 2016, 
only 80 persons were discovered during an attempt of illegal border crossing 
at BCPs54, while in 2017, this number rose to 448 persons55, although (as already 
51 The Croatian Ministry of the Interior communicated to the Government the need to pro-
cure 60 off-road vehicles, QUAD vehicles and drones for better control of green and blue 
border, but only in April 2017, and public procurement in the amount of 9.6 million EUR 
was realised in 2018. This communication was a consequence of as much as 98 recom-
mendations by the EU Schengen evaluators that had to establish the level of readiness of 
Croatian police forces to control the state border. The evaluators suggested that Croatian 
police forces used more hi-technology in their work for the control of wast and inaccessi-
ble parts of the border. See: http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/MUP-RAZMATRA-
NABAVU-DRONOVA-Hrvatske-granice-ce-nadzirati-bespilotne-letjelice (5.9.2018).
52 ‘’Clandestine entries at border-crossing points (BCPs) detected in the European Union 
(EU) from 2009 to 2017’’, www.statista.com/statistics/454802/number-of-clandestine-en-
tries-at-bcps-to-the-eu/ (5.8.2018).
53 Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, supra note 23, p. 20.
54 Izvješće o radu carinske uprave za 2016. godinu, Carinska uprava RH, Zagreb, February 
2017, p. 25.
55 Izvješće o radu carinske uprave za 2017. godinu, Carinska uprava RH, Zagreb, January 2018, 
p. 26.
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mentioned) irregular migrations were generally in steep decline then. During 
the same period, the press extensively reported on clandestine entries to Croatia 
involving land vehicles.56 After having been stuck for months in the camps at 
the Serbian-Croatian border or the Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Croatian bor-
der, they tried to get out of this situation and reach their final destinations by 
hiding within legitimate cargo in vehicles or train wagons.57 The fact that the 
accommodation centre for illegal migrants in Croatia’s capital Zagreb is situated 
in the closest vicinity of the marshalling yard, allowing migrants to board the 
ongoing trains very easily, does not help the situation at all.58 When it comes to 
railways, the major problem is the Croatian-Serbian BCP of Tovarnik-Šid, situ-
ated on the Xth corridor, where incidents with migrants illegally boarding trains 
occurred daily during 2017, with a decrease in 2018, following more stringent 
police inspections. On railway BCPs between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, there are practically no detected migrant incidents, making this way and 
route of irregular entry obviously far less attractive.59
4.1.  Human Victims
Migrant crisis does not come only at economic cost; it costs lives as well. 
Many times illegal migrants are discovered only after their cries for help coming 
from vehicles or containers60 had been heard. Sometimes, however, unfortunate-
56 Butigan, S., U Hrvatsku pokušavaju ilegalno ući skriveni u vagonima s brašnom, at 
http://www.glas-slavonije.hr/312208/1/U-Hrvatsku-pokusavaju-ilegalno-uci-skriveni-u-
 vagonima-s-brasnom (20.9.2018); Vežnaver, F., Deset ilegalnih migranata u vagonu iz 
Karlovca stiglo u riječku luku, at http://novilist.hr/Vijesti/Crna-kronika/Deset-ilegalnih-
migranata-u-vagonu-iz-Karlovca-stiglo-u-rijecku-luku (20.9.2018).
57 OTKRIVENI ILEGALNI MIGRANTI NA JANKOMIRU: Danima su se skrivali među te-
retom, spasio ih poziv u pomoć, at https://net.hr/danas/crna-kronika/otkriveni-ilegalni-
migranti-na-jankomiru-danima-su-se-skrivali-medu-teretom-spasio-ih-poziv-u-pomoc 
(20.9.2018).
58 They are accommodated at the Red Cross facility on the outskirts of Zagreb, in the closest 
vicinity of the marshalling yard.
59 The interviewed carriers are mainly operating via BTCs at the northern border of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with Croatia (BTC Šamac and BTC Brčko-Drenovci), and the southern 
border (BTC Ploče ). At the BTC Šamac there was only one migrant incident in 2018. Both 
of those routes are less attractive for migrants since they are very far from the Slovenian 
border. On the other hand, railway transport via the BTC Volinja, which is very close to 
the border, is used very rarely or not at all.
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ly, only their dead bodies are discovered.61 The usual reason of death is danger-
ous nature of the cargo within which they have been hiding, lack of water and/
or exposure to heat during the summer, or exposure to cold during the winter. 
Humanitarian workers at immigration camps report that the only way for the 
migrants from various countries that have reached Serbia or Bosnia and Her-
zegovina to cross the Croatian border and reach the Western European coun-
tries is by using services of smugglers or by hiding within trucks or wagons62, 
whereas the latter option entangles great risk, but is free.
The major problem arises, however, more to the East, at the borders with 
greatest risk of irregular entries of immigrants: those between Bulgaria and 
Serbia, as well as between Macedonia and Serbia. Serbian officials report of 
proactive measures taken to prevent migrants from reaching Serbia in the first 
place, by organising joint border police task forces from various countries help-
ing Serbian police at the Bulgarian-Serbian border (cooperation with Slovenian, 
Austrian, and Slovak police forces), as well as at the Greek-Macedonian border 
(where Serbian police officers help local police forces).63 According to Serbian 
Chief Police Advisor Radiša Ristović, as much as 60% of illegal  migrants are 
detected at Serbian borders, whereas the rest are detected (and returned to Ser-
bia) at Croatian borders.64 A specimen of 100% illegal immigrants to whom this 
statement refers includes, of course, only the discovered migrants. Migrants are 
mainly taking the so-called green and blue line to cross illegally between coun-
tries (i.e. outside the legal border crossings).
Looking westwards from Croatia, during the migration peak period of 2015-
2016, the attempts of clandestine entries by land transport vehicles to Austria 
61 See supra, p. 113 and footnote 36.
62 Dženana Kalamujić from the association ‘’Are you Syrious’’ in Skorin, I., Migranti opet 
umalo stradali u vagonu s bitumenom: policija i vatrogasci u Karlovcu jedva spasili jed-
nog dok su drugi bježali, 24 August 2017, https://vijesti.rtl.hr/novosti/hrvatska/2713435/
migranti-opet-umalo-stradali-u-vagonu-s-bitumenom-policija-i-vatrogasci-u-karlovcu-
jedva-spasili-jednog-dok-su-drugi-bjezali/ (3.8.2018).
63 Video-report of speech by Radiša Ristović, Chief Police Adviser, Head of the Border De-
partment, Republic of Serbia at ‘’Panel 2: Border crossings - procedures and examples of 
good / bad practice, 5th Business Conference: Transport & Logistics of South East Europe 
and Danube Region – TIL 2018’’, Belgrade, 22 March 2018, http://www.massmediainterna-
tional.rs/Video-TIL2018 (3.8.2018). According to the same source, during 2017 one million 
of migrants entered Serbia, which did not interfere much with the general flow of pas-
senger transport in Serbia, which amounted to 68 million in 2017.
64 Ristović Video-report, ibid.
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and Italy were so huge that Austria introduced stringent measures and started 
inspecting all trains coming from Italy, especially during the night. The major 
question remaining is the following: What is the grey number we are talking 
about? Our previous analysis has shown that less than 20% of asylum seekers in 
the Western European states, who used the Western Balkan route to enter the re-
gion, had previously been identified and registered. The rest of them either used 
facilitators (smugglers), or were successful in clandestine entries. No data can be 
found on the percentage of migrants that use one or the other way for irregular 
border crossing, but we know that the number of facilitators in the period 2009-
2017 showed considerably smaller oscillations65 than the statistics on clandestine 
entries in the same period, as shown above. The use of facilitators along the 
migration route is financed through the traditional Islamic system of hawala, 
based on honour and trust, which allegedly functions very well in practice.66 
Those with no means have to revert to a much riskier, yet obviously quite suc-
cessful, practice of clandestine use of trucks and trains on their legitimate routes 
through different countries. All this may lead us to the conclusion that clan-
destine entries using (land) transport vehicles is presently a preferred means 
of irregular border crossings, and a neuralgic spot for secondary (undetected) 
movements of migrants along the Balkan route and the Eastern Mediterranean 
route. How are the countries on the Balkan route, in particular Croatia, which 
is in focus of this discussion, fighting this newly raising trend? What measures 
and technical equipment are being implemented by the police forces and the 
customs to detect illegal migrants, and are those measures adversely affecting 
regular transport operations? Can they only be described as police and customs 
border control measures, do they originate from the spectra of transport secu-
rity measures, or is it a hybrid between the two? 
65 Number of facilitators in the EU throughout the years: 2009 (9,170), 2010 (8,630), 2011 
(6,960), 2012 (7,720), 2013 (6,900), 2014 (10,230), 2015 (12,020), 2016 (12,620), 2017 (10,210). 
See: Statista, Illegal immigration facilitators detected in the European Union (EU) from 
2009 to 2017 (in 2,000 people), www.statista.com/statistics/454817/number-of-facilitators-
of-illegal-eu-immigration/ (3.8.2018).
66 See Van de Bunt, H.,The Role of Hawala Bankers in the Transfer of Proceeds from Or-
ganised Crime, in: Siegel, D. and Nelen, H. (eds.), Organised Crime: Culture, Markets and 
Policies, New York: Springer, 2008, pp. 113-126.
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4.2.  Transport Safety and Security Measures in Combating Irregular 
Migrations
The border crossing procedures for trucks and trains carrying cargo are ex-
tremely versatile and involve both the police and the customs activities.67 The 
whole process of crossing the state border in an international freight transport 
involves the presentation of numerous documents, which can generally be di-
vided into three categories, with some variations between road and rail trans-
port. The first group of documents needed are those relating to cargo itself, the 
second relate to the vehicle, and the third group of documents are those linked 
to the driver personally. Some sources mention as much as 54 documents in to-
tal, whereas will never all of them be needed for an individual freight transport 
case.68 The reason for such numerous documentation has its roots in a compli-
cated network of rules and measures related to modern international freight 
transport, envisaged by a large number of legal acts governing transport and 
international trade (e.g. export-import documents, transport documents, opera-
tor’s transport permits, driver’s certificates, etc.). The reason for other measures 
lies in the need for preserving public order and health (e.g. veterinary, phytosan-
itary and quarantine inspections, fighting organised crime, immigration, etc.).
Procedures at border crossings to check relevant documents by different 
authorities and, if needed, the physical inspection of the vehicle, are lengthy, and 
thus inevitably influence the flow of transport. Apart from some older and more 
traditional measures that have been existing in transport for a longer time, modern 
challenges, such as raising the threats of terrorist attacks conducted primarily 
by transport means (such as 9/11, and more recent attacks by trucks in different 
EU countries), as well as organised crimes of drugs and weapons, smuggling 
and the THB, have provoked the sophistication of the existing transport-related 
measures intended to fight these crimes or the introduction of new ones.
It is sometimes difficult to draw a precise line between different categories of 
measures that might be of interest to this discussion according to their primary 
source or authority enforcing it. For example, traditionally, most of the measures 
involving physical inspection of the cargo are performed by the customs, since 
67 The police are allowed to inspect vehicles, including the inspection of the outer and inner 
part of the vehicle and research of the police databases, using technical tools and dogs. 
Art. 27 par. 1 al. 3; Art. 27. par. 4 of the State Border Monitoring Act (Zakon o nadzoru 
državne granice), Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, no. 83/13, 27/16.
68 ‘’Model on Integrated Controls at Border Crossings’’, United Nations Economic and So-
cial Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 2012, p. 20 at:  https://www.unescap.
org/sites/default/files/MICBC-fulltext_0.pdf (5.8.2018).
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the identification of cargo as declared in the documents traditionally falls with-
in their jurisdiction, which also means adequate technical equipment for cargo 
inspection by the customs (e.g. scales and x-ray scanners). In order to best al-
locate the technical resources, as well as to save time for the carriers, the border 
police, which has recently been faced with a very high threat of illegal migrants 
hiding within the cargo, now works closely with the customs and uses the data 
collected by their work, or performs its own inspections by the customs’ equip-
ment in order to detect possible criminal activities performed by or within the 
transport vehicles. The two authorities have therefore become more and more 
interdependent in their everyday work, and have to be perceived together with 
respect to fighting the organised crimes in question. Since an all-encompassing 
analysis of all the measures related to international freight transport is far be-
yond the scope of this paper, we will single out some of the measures used in 
land transport that, in our opinion, might help combat organised crimes of hu-
man trafficking and smuggling. We will also analyse how the new surge of those 
types of organised crimes influences further development of security measures 
and border police inspections performed on land transport vehicles. 
a. Physical inspection69
Physical inspection remains the basic method of police inspection combat-
ing irregular migrations. It is the only method used to inspect the interior of 
both laden and empty wagons in railway transport, and the inspection of empty 
vehicles and containers, as well as non-sealed laden trailers in road transport.70 
When it comes to laden and sealed trucks and containers, outer physical inspec-
tion of the truck is the only one out of many inspection methods used to detect 
suspicious cargo or other aberrations from the norm and subject the cargo to 
other inspections, the last of which is physical inspection of the interior of the 
vehicle or container, including breaking of original seals.
Before the outbreak of the migration crisis, physical inspection of trains and 
trucks at the border was minimal (for trains), and usually performed swiftly. 
For example, prior to the migrant crisis, a train crossing from Serbia to Croatia 
had to stop only at the Serbian border at the BCP Šid, where the inspection crew 
69 Most of the technical inside information have been gathered from interviews with Rail 
Cargo Logistics and/or HŽ Cargo, if not stated otherwise.
70 The cargo carried within the Single Market does not have to be sealed for customs rea-
sons. It is up to a consignor do decide whether they will seal the cargo or not for security 
reasons (protection against the theft) during carriage within the EU.
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from both Serbian and Croatian railway operators inspected the integrity of the 
seals on the laden wagons in order to take over the composition from the previ-
ous to the next carrier in charge of the transport. The train then continued its 
journey to the town of Vinkovci deep within Croatian territory, where Croatian 
authorities would perform the rest of the formalities. After the outbreak of the 
migrant crisis, a new railway BCP was established in Tovarnik, on Croatian side 
of the border, where police and customs inspections have been performed ever 
since.71 Croatian police forces perform the physical inspection of laden wagons 
by breaking the original seals on wagon doors and opening them, and then re-
sealing them with new seals, as well as entering this change into the consign-
ment note.  
Taking into account that in railway transport, the number of seals can be 
large, because all entry openings (shafts, doors, windows, etc.) on every wagon 
have to be sealed, and there can be more than 20 wagons in one composition, 
this whole procedure may take up to several hours.72
Similarly, in road transport, the duration of the physical inspection of trucks 
is drastically extended, due to numerous ways in which migrants are finding 
their way into the cargo space of the vehicles. High police sources in Serbia and 
Croatia report immigrants cutting the iron cords that secure the tarpaulin of 
the truck to enter the vehicle, where the person remaining outside of the truck 
than repairs the iron cord by using glue and needle. The physical inspection of 
the truck is therefore performed by strongly pulling the cord securing the tar-
paulin and checking its integrity. The other path that migrants use is by cutting 
the upper side of the tarpaulin and getting inside the vehicle, which makes the 
inspection of tarpaulin with telescopic mirrors from the upper side of the truck 
necessary. Sometimes, migrants heat the plastic cord of the seals on the cargo 
or the vehicle doors to soften and open them in order to penetrate into the ve-
hicle and hide among the cargo, or just break the seals for the same reason. The 
71 According to Art. 11 par. 4 of the State Border Monitoring and Protection Act, the bor-
der crossings on railways have to be built and equipped at the expense of the operator. 
According to Art. 4 par. 4 al. 3 of the same Act, in this case it would be the operator of 
railway infrastructure in Croatia, “HŽ-Infrastruktura “.
72 During the routine check of the train wagons at the Macedonian-Serbian border, 6 mi-
grants have been discovered after they escaped through the wagon floor. Between the 
rails and the wagon floor there are plankings and metal bars through which the im-
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person remaining outside the vehicle then repairs the seal to the best of their 
abilities, forcing the police to check the integrity of every seal during border in-
spections, which prolongs the procedure.73 All these facts have to be taken into 
account when considering the time needed for a proper and thorough physical 
inspection of every truck and freight train.74
Changing of seals during transport presents another problem, apart from 
being time-consuming. The ID number of the seal placed originally at the place 
of departure by the consignor or the operator75 is entered into the transport 
documents. The consignee will have to ascertain that it is the same number on 
the seal upon the arrival of the goods at the destination in order to accept the 
delivery of the cargo. Broken or replaced seals during transport can eventually 
entangle the liability of the carrier for any damage or loss of cargo under the 
applicable law, with very limited possibilities for exoneration. The exception is 
where the seals were broken on orders of public authorities, the customs or the 
police, where the position of the carrier changes. It is not entirely clear from 
the conducted research whose seals are used to reseal the wagons (whether the 
customs’ or the operator’s), and why. In some cases, resealing of wagons is being 
done by the customs, whereas in others, the operator himself puts new seals. 
The difference between the two cases for the position of the operator in case 
of damages can eventually be pivotal. In both cases, the police issue a formal 
record of the procedure to the operator.
There are two more issues involving the sealing of the vehicles or containers 
that have to be mentioned at this point, even if the seals have been tampered 
with and repaired afterwards by the accomplices outside the vehicle. First, one 
has to bear in mind that people inside the sealed vehicle (or container) cannot 
get out without help from outside. This is why they are often discovered only 
after their cries for help or banging are heard or not before they die trapped in-
side the vehicle. Secondly, there were also cases of migrants being discovered in 
trains with intact original seals. This inevitably provoked many questions as to 
the possible involvement (fraudulent or not) of the personnel present at loading 
73 Police report obtained for the purpose of this investigation by the Border Administration, 
Police Headquarters, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, Kl. 212-02/18-
01/88, No. 511-01-62-18 of 7 September 2018, Zagreb. Also: Ristović video-report, supra 
note 63. 
74 In railway transport, the risk of clandestine entries into the wagons exists for all types of 
wagons, and even – in rare cases – tanker wagons.
75 In railway transport, the wagons are sealed with operator’s seals. Exceptionally, the 
operator can accept for carriage wagons already sealed by the consignor if previous 
agreement between the two parties to that effect exists.
125
N. Radionov; I. Savić, The Impact of Irregular Migrations, Smuggling and Human Trafficking on the Land 
Transport Industry: The Croatian Case, PPP god. 58 (2019), 173, str. 103-149
and sealing cargo at the departure point. The loading of a 20-wagon train com-
position with heavy cargo is a lengthy and time-consuming procedure, which 
may take even a couple of days. The composition is sealed at the end of loading, 
opening the possibility for a person to enter into the previously laden wagon 
before the end of loading and sealing. If, however, there is a fraudulent involve-
ment of a consignor’s or an operator’s personnel in this activity, we have a point 
of conversion of irregular migration into a crime of smuggling and forming of 
new opportunistic networks of smugglers. There is no definite proof, though, for 
such behaviour to this point.
In the period before 2015 and the introduction of stringent border police 
inspections involving unconditional opening of all wagons for physical inspec-
tion, it was possible for successive carriers to take over the composition with in-
tact seals and hidden migrants that get discovered during their period of liabil-
ity. The physical inspections of vehicles at the BCPs in road transport are used 
as the first method to detect suspicious vehicles in order to subject them to other 
types of inspections elaborated below. However, in railway transport, physical 
inspections are the only type of security procedure undertaken by Croatian po-
lice forces upon entry into its territory and hence into the EU, but eventually a 
very costly one for the carrier. On many occasions, the police ordered the car-
rier to empty the wagons laden with cargo, e.g. timbering, or cargo packed in 
boxes or sacks, in order to ascertain that nobody was hidden within. After the 
inspection, the cargo needs to be laden again, and all this has to be performed 
by the carrier’s crew. For this reason, one of the operators working with this 
type of cargo on this relation had to employ six people full-time at the BCP To-
varnik only for the performance of this manual work and assisting the police 
in their inspections. The costs, of course, have to be borne solely by the opera-
tor, increasing already enormous extra side-costs caused by migrants in railway 
transport. Lastly, the police have issued special instructions as to the stowage 
of some types of cargo in order to allow free passage of police officers between 
stacks of cargo within the wagon (leaving empty passages between, e.g., timber 
and boxes). Although understandable from the security point of view and ful-
filling the crime-fighting purpose, such stowage renders cargo prone to damage 
during transport, leads to insufficient use of cargo space and increases the risk 
of the carrier’s liability for damage.
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b. Vehicle weight and dimension control76
The rules on weights and dimensions of trucks, buses and coaches represent 
a very important part of road safety in the European Union. Their aim is to as-
certain that vehicles entering the traffic system of a country comply with rules 
on maximum weights in road transport, in order to prevent damaging of roads, 
bridges and tunnels by very heavy or overloaded vehicles, as well as to ascertain 
fair market competition and free movement of goods within the single market 
in road transport. In some countries, weighing of vehicles is used also for tax 
purposes, since taxes are paid based on the weight of the cargo loaded.77 Main 
rules for vehicle weights and dimensions in road transport have been set by the 
Directive (EU) 2015/71978, complemented by several other legislative acts.79
Vehicle weighing is performed for two major reasons at all BCPs in Croatia 
for heavy road vehicles by the use of two different scales. The first scale mea-
sures the axle pressure of a vehicle very slowly moving above it, in order to as-
certain that the pressure on every single axle is not beyond the prescribed limit, 
and can be characterised as a (transport) safety measure. The other scaling is 
performed by a fixed platform scale, where whole immobile truck is being mea-
sured in order to ascertain that its gross weight is not beyond the prescribed limit 
and that the net weight of the cargo is consistent with the weight declared by 
the transport documentation, which represents a combination of transport safety 
and the customs’ measure. The deviation of 2% maximum is allowed, mostly due 
to the oscillations in the weight of the fuel in truck tanks and the personal weight 
of the driver. In practice, usually the deviation up to 500 kg is tolerated.
In order to shorten the border procedures and avoid the infringement of the 
EU legislation dealing with the intra-EU road transport and the shortcomings 
76 Inside information and technical details on certain procedures regarding this measure 
have been collected through interviews given by workers inside Rail Cargo Logistics and 
M-San Logistika.
77 See differences among EU Member States in a vehicle taxation study done for the Euro-
pean Commission – TISpt, Study on vehicle taxation in the Member States of the Europe-
an Union, Final report, January 2002, available at https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
sites/taxation/files/docs/body/vehicle_tax_study_15-02-2002.pdf (25.9.2018).
78 Directive (EU) 2015/719 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 
amending Council Directive 96/53/EC laying down for certain road vehicles circulat-
ing within the Community the maximum authorised dimensions in national and inter-
national traffic and the maximum authorised weights in international traffic, OJ L 115, 
6.5.2015, pp. 1-10.
79 See more on the issue of weights and dimensions in the EU at: https://ec.europa.eu/trans-
port/modes/road/weights-and-dimensions_en (5.8.2018).
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of an insufficient inspection system80, several EU countries have recently intro-
duced the system of built-in road vehicle weighing sensors for vehicles in move-
ment (the so-called ‘Weigh in Motion’ – WIM), measuring and eventually auto-
matically fining operators of the vehicles that infringe the norms from 1-30% of 
the prescribed weights.81 Croatia has not introduced the WIM technology yet, 
whereas road vehicle weighing at border crossings represents a routine and 
mandatory procedure. Due to the size of the vehicle and its tanks, the tolerated 
margin of oscillation in weight of a few hundred kilograms becomes important 
information with respect to the extra weight of possible clandestine passengers 
hidden within the vehicle.
Can we say that the road transport safety measure of vehicle weighing may 
be used as a measure in combating irregular migrations, smuggling and human 
trafficking? Not really, as the number of persons that can penetrate the truck 
and hide within its cargo space during voyage, thus altering the overall weight 
of the vehicle, is relatively small in most cases. Their weight would probably fall 
within the tolerable margin of the fuel (which can amount to around 1,000 kg 
for large trucks) and would therefore not be useful as a crime-combating mea-
sure in this respect. Illegal immigrants do not use buses for clandestine entries, 
since they may easily be detected by the driver and other personnel due to their 
appearance, lack of language skills and other features. Therefore, trains are first-
choice vehicles for a larger number of migrants. Axle pressure measurements 
for trains are performed at marshalling yards in many cities, but not at the BCPs. 
Train scales are used in order for the carrier to ascertain the weight of the cargo 
carried, to calculate the freight, or for safety reasons related to the use of railway 
infrastructure. Due to extremely large weights of expandable train parts (e.g. 
the breaks), the weights of long train compositions can vary significantly; this 
measure can thus be perceived mainly as a transport safety measure, and not as 
a security measure in combating irregular migrations. 
80 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/53/EC of 25 July 
1996 laying down for certain road vehicles circulating within the Community the maxi-
mum authorised dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum au-
thorised weights in international traffic’, COM(2013) 195 final/2, OJ C 327/133 of 12.11.2013, 
p. 135.
81 Hungary has lately introduced this system. It has been in full implementation since 1 July 
2018. It will, allegedly, improve the enforcement of the rules on maximum weights from 2% to 
50% of the vehicles. See: ‘’Mađari uveli vaganje i kažnjavanje bez zaustavljanja’’, Kamion&Bus 
of 18 June 2018 at: https://www.kamion-bus.hr/1588 (6.8.2018).
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c. Scanners and cameras
Scanners are a widely used security measure used by the customs and the 
border police for two main purposes: to reveal false declaration of goods (the cus-
toms’ competence) and to prevent crimes, such as smuggling of drugs, weapons, 
people, or artefacts within the legitimate cargo (the border police competence).82 
There are many different types of scanners, depending on the scanned matter 
and the purpose of inspection. The use of scanners has recently become para-
mount with respect to land transport vehicles – trucks and trains – due to the 
massive flow of migrations through the region. Hence, governments of both 
the bordering countries involved, with or without financial support from the 
EU programs, have recently invested large funds in obtaining different types 
of new modern scanners for border controls. In 2018, Serbia reported over 20 
different scanners distributed at all BCPs on the Xth corridor.83 Since 2013, when 
Croatia entered the EU membership, additional 8 heart beat detectors, 41 device 
for CO2 measurement and 8 endoscopes have been procured through the EU 
funds and used together with the existing equipment at all the BCPs with Ser-
bia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Apart from this, Croatian police 
forces have other types of equipment that are used for the control of vehicles in 
search of clandestine passengers, such as device for measurement of the density 
of the material, endoscopes and telescopic mirrors for (physical) inspection of 
the undercarriage and/or the upper side of the vehicle.84 Thermographic and 
infrared cameras are used to detect living organisms inside the vehicle through 
their body temperature, showing the body shape and position.85 Together with 
endoscopic cameras that can be inserted inside the cargo space without physical 
opening of sealed trucks and containers, infrared cameras provide the image of 
the interior. CO2 scanners are inserted inside the cargo space in order to detect 
the presence of this gas produced by human breathing. They can therefore be 
used only in closed vehicles, such as cisterns, where there is no airflow.
82 ‘’Model of Integrated Control at Border Crossings’’, ESCAP…pp. 8-9.
83 Video report: Veselin Milošević, Assistant Director of the Customs Administration of the 
Ministry of Finance of Serbia, TIL conference at: http://www.massmediainternational.rs/
Video-TIL2018 (7.8.2018).
84 Police report, see supra note 73.
85 More on thermographic cameras in police use in Croatia see: Krišto, Mate, Primjena ter-
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The use of different scanners represents an efficient method of routine in-
spection of trucks and trains in order to detect and single out suspicious ve-
hicles and subject them to more rigorous and detailed inspections by other 
methods. Since 2016-2017, trucks with sealed cargo space have been subjected 
to inspection by heartbeat detectors, which exist at all major Croatian BCPs 
opened for freight transport.86 If heartbeat is detected, the truck is subjected 
to physical inspection of the cargo space, including breaking up of original 
seals on the container or truck door if they exist. Once an illegal migrant is 
discovered, the owner of the vehicle (transport company) becomes marked for 
good. Information regarding the vehicle, identity of a driver and the carrier 
are recorded in police archives and this vehicle (or other vehicles of the same 
carrier) is subject to inspection every time it tries to cross the border.87
Another very effective technology in combating organised crime are gam-
ma-ray or x-ray scanners for vehicles (the RTG), depending on the allowed level 
of radiation and the purpose of the inspection. In order to optimise the use of 
present equipment, and due to the fact that Croatian police forces at present 
have no RTG scanners, the scanners of the customs are used for police inspec-
tions as well.88 The RTG scanners are used for (random) control of trucks both at 
the BCPs, as well as deeper within Croatian territory89, where some of the trucks, 
according to the police assessment, are subjected to this inspection.90 On the 
Serbian-Croatian border, one of the scanners is located at Bajakovo-Batrovci91, 
86 See Communication of 7 September 2018, MUP RH. The heartbeat detectors can detect 
all creatures with heart beat inside the vehicle, as small as a mouse. HRT video at: https://
vijesti.hrt.hr/406726/pripreme-za-schengen-u-punom-jeku (8.9.2018).
87 Information given by a border police officer on the occasion of the Police Day, Split, 27 
September 2018.
88 Ibid.
89 The border police have jurisdiction to act also in depths of the territory of the state in 
order to detect and prevent illegal border crossing and all types of trans-border crimes. 
Art. 36 State Border Monitoring Act.
90 Since 2017, trucks have been sent to the RTG at the BCPs according to police discretion, 
as well as randomly stopped along the highway, mostly on the Xth corridor, and subjected 
to the RTG scanning. During inspection, the driver of the vehicle steps out, and mobile 
RTG scanner-truck passes along the inspected vehicle while scanning. Although there is 
considerable concern for health hazard from radiation for truck drivers, highly alerting 
the International Road Union (IRU), recent studies have shown there is no occupational 
or health hazard involved from the RTG scanning of trucks. See: Prlić, Ivica, Scientific 
Study on External Ionising Radiation Exposure During Cargo/Vehicle Radiographic In-
spections, Institute for Medical Research and Occupational Health, Zagreb, April 2012 at: 
https://www.iru.org/sites/default/files/2016-01/en-x-ray-executivesummary.pdf (9.9.2018).
91 Ristović Video-report, supra note 63.
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the most important BCP between the two countries situated on the Xth corridor, 
and for that reason one of the two BCPs most endangered by the flow of illegal 
migrants along the Balkan route.92 The RTG scanners are not used for inspec-
tion of trains, nor are there information stating that Croatian police forces or the 
customs presently have such (expensive) technology for this mode of transport 
at their disposal.
Croatia aims at complying fully with the technical requirements for the en-
try into the Schengen area by the end of 2018, and being admitted into it before 
the end of the mandate of Juncker Commission in 2019.93 In June 2017, Croatia 
joined the Schengen Information System (SIS)94; in order to facilitate and speed 
up joining the Schengen, 120 million Euros from the EU funds have been al-
located to it to procure state-of-the-art scanners, cameras and other technical 
devices necessary for the efficient control of the external borders of the EU.95 
92 The other one is the BPC Šid-Tovarnik on the same part of the Croatian-Serbian bor-
der. During 2018, there were numerous press releases on individual or small groups of 
illegal migrants, often families with children, discovered hidden in trucks. See Tele-
graf RS, Prikolica puna lešnika, a iz njih izronile glave migranata: Carinici na Batro-
vcima otkrili avganistansku porodicu u kamionu iz Turske, http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/
hronika/2959116-prikolica-puna-lesnika-a-iz-njih-izronile-glave-migranata-carinici-na-
batrovcima-otkrili-avganistansku-porodicu-u-kamionu-iz-turske-foto (7.8.2018).
93 Government of the Republic of Croatia, PM: Croatia aims to join the Schengen area and Euro 
zone, at https://vlada.gov.hr/news/pm-croatia-aims-to-join-schengen-area-and-euro-zone/22687 
(20/09/2018).
94 European Commission, Croatia becomes part of the Schengen Information System (SIS), 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/croatia-becomes-part-schengen-information-sys-
tem-sis_en (20.9.2018).
95 Treaty of Accession of Croatia to the EU lists the entire Schengen acquis that needs to be 
implemented. See Annex II of the Treaty of Accession (Treaty between the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Re-
public of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic 
of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slo-
venia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) 
and the Republic of Croatia concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the 
European Union), OJ L 112, 24.4.2012, p. 10-110. Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 
7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the ap-
plication of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee 
of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implemen-
tation of Schengen, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27.
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In 2018, Croatia reported on having spent almost the entire sum and acquir-
ing substantial technical equipment necessary for complying with the Schen-
gen requirements and efficient fight against organised crimes, contraband and 
tax frauds. Croatia has renewed its border crossing facilities and acquired vari-
ous technical devices: police vehicles, radars, heartbeat scanners, drug and ex-
plosives detectors, toxic gas detectors, radiation pagers, devices for measuring 
the density of materials, etc.96 However, the most important technical devices 
in combating irregular migrations were mainly procured as of 2017 – after the 
peak of the migrations had passed. In comparison, Hungarian national police 
purchased six heartbeat detectors in 2010 with a 75% contribution of EU funds, 
and started using them at borders with Serbia and Ukraine, checking 50% of the 
trucks entering Hungary in search of illegal migrants.97 The EU experience and 
know-how, had evidently already existed during the peak and the aftermath of 
the migrant crisis on the Xth corridor, but the reaction in obtaining the efficient 
technology seems to be somewhat belated.
Notwithstanding this, the sophisticated technical equipment used at the 
BCPs along the Xth corridor from 2017 on, triggering increased efficiency in de-
tecting clandestine entries by trains or trucks, resulted in redirection of the ma-
jor flow of immigrants. Instead of using the Balkan route from Serbia to Croatia 
along the Xth corridor, immigrants are increasingly using the Eastern Mediterra-
nean route through Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina towards 
its most north-western border with Croatia, where at one point (near the Croa-
tian town of Karlovac), there are only 70 km of Croatian territory between the 
borders with Bosnia on the one side and Slovenia on the other. Since Croatia 
has increased both the manpower and the technical equipment in controlling 
the blue and green border with Bosnia and Herzegovina (using e.g. drones with 
thermographic cameras), the pressure to cross border before winter is rising for 
migrants concentrated alongside this border, and many more were headed to-
wards Western Europe by the end of 2018.98
96 “Pripreme za Schengen u punom jeku”, video-report, Croatian Radio-Television HRT on 
24 September 2017 at: https://vijesti.hrt.hr/406726/pripreme-za-schengen-u-punom-jeku 
(8.8.2018).
97 “Supply of a device for highly effective detection of persons hiding in vehicles, without 
vehicle disassembly”, EC- European and Home Affairs at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-af-
fairs/financing/fundings/projects/project_example_029_en (8.8.2018).
98 In autumn 2018, hundreds of illegal immigrants were detected crossing the mountains at 
western borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia, with fear that this dangerous 
path might lead to deaths and humanitarian crisis when harsh winter in the region starts. 
See video report at: https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/iz-bosanskog-gss-a-snimili-
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d. Security agencies
Although this is often considered confidential business information and 
hence rarely publicly disclosed, the thefts of cargo in railway transport, espe-
cially in container transport, has become a serious problem for the industry, 
according to Dušan Garibović, the CEO of Serbian rail cargo carrier ‘’Srbija Kar-
go a.d.’’.99 Combined with the problem of migrants entering clandestinely into 
wagons or containers during voyage, railway carriers in the region launched an 
unprecedented practice in this mode of transport: hiring security agencies to ac-
company and monitor the trains, especially during the period of waiting before 
the BCPs. Garibović mentioned that this operator started outsourcing services of 
a security agency for their trains in July 2017, after having been confronted with 
serious problems of thefts and illegal migrants during the last couple of years. 
After that, in the period from August 2017 to March 2018, when this information 
was offered, both the thefts and the migrant incidents had ceased completely – 
there was not one single reported case.100 A similar trend has been reported in 
Croatia too: there, ‘’Rail Cargo Logistics – Croatia’’ is currently contemplating 
hiring security agency services to accompany the compositions of more valuable 
cargo to be carried by their trains in the near future. HŽ-Cargo, the dominant 
railway cargo carrier, is presently not contemplating this measure.101
It is fairly certain that the cost of hiring security agencies will eventually 
be reflected in the cost of transport service, which, in turn, might influence the 
competitiveness of local operators in the long run. Employing security agen-
cies to escort vehicles is a well-known and widely used method, particularly in 
air and shipping industry. In air transport, in the aftermath of 9/11, armed air 
marshals started to board planes, increasing security standards during flights 
kolone-migranata-pronasli-su-nove-ekstremno-opasne-rute-prema-hrvatskoj-bojimo se-
 da-ce-nas-zima-dovesti-do-prave-drame/7822161/ (13.9.2018). The reports state there 
were around 60,000 people between Greece and Albania in mid-2018, whose only tar-
get was to reach Western Europe through this corridor in the forthcoming period. See 
Žabec, K., Čak 60.000 migranata preko nove rute stiže pred vrata Hrvatske! Ako pronađu 




99 Garibović, Dušan, video report of ‘’Interactive Panel 2: Border crossings – procedures and 
examples of good/bad practice at ‘’Transport & Logistics of South East Europe and Dan-
ube Region - TIL Conference’’, Belgrade 22 March 2018, available at: http://www.massme-
diainternational.rs/Video-TIL2018 (28.8.2018).
100 Ibid. 
101 As stated by an HŽ Cargo officer who gave the interview.
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and assisting the crew in case of security breaches or incidents.102 In shipping, 
serious and frequent attacks by Somali pirates to commercial vessels transiting 
the Gulf of Aden developed a whole new branch of services – those of heavily 
armed guards on board vessels, who provide a full-scale security services to the 
vessel while transiting the risk zone, and effectively deterring pirate attacks if 
and when they occur.103 However, the practice of outsourcing armed guards to 
accompany the trains in transit is a brand new practice, boosted by two types of 
illegal  activities: thefts, which had been going on long before the migrant crisis 
in the region of South East Europe and did not lead to introducing any particu-
lar security measure outside railway industry itself, and irregular migrations as 
a very recent phenomena. It may be concluded that the latter problem was the 
last straw that forced the railway carriers to introduce costly solution to their 
everyday business in order to avoid lengthy detentions of trains at the borders 
and other collateral costs caused by the detection of migrants in wagons during 
routine police inspections, as well as to minimise the losses attributable to thefts. 
5. THE IMPACT OF SECURITY MEASURES ON TRANSPORT INDUSTRY104
Due to a very high risk of clandestine entries of illegal migrants in trains and 
trucks on the routes going through Croatia, the police inspections and meth-
ods used at Croatian road and railway BCPs are today undoubtedly much more 
stringent and sophisticated than they were in the period before 2015. What are 
the precise implications and costs of such a trend for transport industry? The 
analysis conducted on a specimen of 18 randomly chosen trains operating along 
the Xth corridor on the Tovarnik-Savski Marof route from Serbia to Slovenia (via 
Croatia) has shown that the average time spent on police inspections at the Ser-
bian-Croatian border at the Šid-Tovarnik BCP is 53 minutes per train, while the 
average waiting time at the Croatian BCP in Savski Marof for Slovenian police 
inspection in Dobova BCP is 32 minutes per train. In the latter case, the train 
102 For more details see: Fitzgerald, P. P., Air Marshalls - The need for legal certainty, Journal 
of Air Law and Commerce, 2010 (vol 75), p. 357.
103 For more details see: Mudrić, M., The Guardcon contract, knock-for-knock clauses, DCFR 
and unfair terms (Part I), The Journal of International Maritime Law, vol. 21 (2015), pp. 51-62; 
Berglund, N., Shipowners arm to fight piracy, Norway International Network, January, 18 
(2011); Mudrić, M., Armed Guards on Vessels: Insurance and Liability, Journal of Interna-
tional Maritime Law, vol. 50 (2011), no. 165, pp. 217-268; Martin, J. S., Fighting Piracy with 
Private Security Measures: When Contract Law should tell Parties to Walk the Plank, 
American University Law Review, vol. 59 (2010), p. 5.
104 Some of the conclusions given in this chapter stem from the information given by officers 
in road and rail transport industry (as described supra), and will not be cited individually.
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waits due to the police inspection of the previous train by Slovenian police105, 
the time varying from no waiting at all (if there is no previous train) to as much 
as 3h 35min (if the inspection of the previous train has not started at all or if il-
legal imigrants have been discovered). The average time spent at Croatian entry 
and exit BCPs for the trains observed was 1h 37min in average.106
Sources from railway industry speak of an increase in the time a train 
spends at the border crossing by a minimum of 30 minutes in average after the 
outbreak of migrant crisis. In other words, before 2015, a train had spent up to 
30 minutes at both borders, whereas today, this takes a minimum of one hour 
(and more). The problem is that this can amount up to 3-4 hours of delay at a 
BCP for a particular train where illegal migrants are discovered, as well as for all 
the subsequent trains waiting behind it at the BCP, where problems for the train 
operators become even more serious. If illegal migrants are discovered inside a 
train, the train crew may be subjected to an interrogation procedure and wagons 
have to be sealed anew. If a passenger train arrives at the BCP in the meantime, 
it has priority, and the police officers (who are scarce) will leave the freight train 
waiting while performing the inspection of the passenger train, prolonging the 
waiting time. Furthermore, due to the organisation of railway transport and the 
division of operation and infrastructure on the market, as well as technological 
reasons of railway transport, at the border, compositions often have to change 
crew and locomotives, which then wait for a certain time at the border (e.g. two 
hours), and if the train does not come, they leave. However, the cost of their hire, 
amounting to thousands of Euros, still has to be paid by the operator whose 
train was belated without their fault. The train path that has been allocated to 
the operator of that particular train (that eventually cannot be operated) is then 
lost too, and the train, originally detained by the police for a couple of hours 
at the border due to anti-immigration procedures, will have to wait (and pay) 
for another locomotive, crew and train path in order to perform his contractual 
obligation. Waiting for the allocation of an extraordinary train path can last for 
more than a day on busy parts of the infrastructure. Overall delays in perform-
ing transport service are therefore increasingly becoming a serious problem for 
the operators, who are liable for the delay of cargo under the contract of car-
riage.107 Although police inspections, due to an extraordinary migration crisis, 
105 Train driver is not allowed to stop the train between the state border and the BTC. Art. 22 
State Border Monitoring Act.
106 ‘’Pregled zadržavanja vlakova na relaciji Tovarnik DG - Savski Marof DG’’, Excell docu-
ment, Rail Cargo Logistics, 7 September 2018.
107 According to Art. 23 (1) COTIF-CIM, ‘’The carrier shall be liable for loss or damage result-
ing from the total or partial loss of, or damage to, the goods between the time of taking 
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amount to extraordinary circumstances and are beyond a carrier’s control, he 
will inevitably suffer great extraordinary costs and possibly losses that he will 
probably eventually have to bear.
Although the infrastructure used in road transport differs very much from 
the one in railway transport, and indeed allows passing over the vehicles, the 
problems with delays at border crossings between Croatia and other countries 
for road carriers are the same. The delays are caused by detailed inspections of 
vehicles, especially trucks and busses, including several transport safety mea-
sures, but also new security police measures introduced as a direct consequence 
of the migrant crisis, as shown above. However, these procedures cause very 
long queues of trucks waiting at the BCPs to the Schengen area, especially on 
the working days. This is of particular importance for Croatia, since it is an EU 
Member, but not yet in the Schengen area.108 Therefore, notwithstanding the in-
spections conducted by Croatian police forces and the customs on trucks, trains 
and their cargo while entering Croatia at the BCPs with Serbia, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, and Montenegro, only a couple hours of transit later, even more de-
tailed inspection procedures have to be performed again at the Slovenian or 
Hungarian borders, on the other side of the small country.109 Since 2017, more 
over of the goods and the time of delivery and for the loss or damage resulting from the 
transit period being exceeded, whatever the railway infrastructure used’’. Further on, if 
loss or damage results from the transit period being exceeded, the carrier must pay com-
pensation not exceeding four times the carriage charge (see art. 33 (1) with regard to Art. 
16 COTIF-CIM). Appendix B to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail 
(COTIF) of 9 June 1999, Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract of International Carriage 
of Goods by Rail (CIM).
108 There is a special regulation that lays down rules governing border control of persons 
crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union. See Regula-
tion (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a 
Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code), OJ (2016) L 77, p. 1.
109 Some authors wrote about the position of those Schengen candidate states and the 
problem their weak borders had caused to the EU. See Šegvić, S., Šengenski režim 
upravljanja vanjskim granicama (EU Schengen regime for administering EU external 
borders), Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, vol. 48 (2011), no. 1, pp. 13-14. After 
the 2016 Schengen evaluation of Croatia undertaken by the EU, the Council of the EU 
issued a Recommendation, in which it gave 21 recommendations with regard to police 
cooperation (with the neighbouring countries). See Recommendation on addressing the 
deficiencies identified in the 2016 evaluation of Croatia in view of fulfilling the conditions 
necessary for the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of police cooperation, 
Brussels, 11 July 2017 (OR. en), Interinstitutional File: 2017/0055 (NLE).
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stringent police controls at the Schengen borders110, queues forming in front of 
e.g. the BCP Bregana between Croatia and Slovenia can on the weekdays be over 
10 km long, taking trucks many hours to cross. Waiting at the Bajakovo-Batrovci 
BCP with Serbia can be even worse, sometimes taking two days for a truck to 
pass the border. Road haulers are protesting, claiming that long waiting hours 
and idle time spent waiting at the BCPs cost them around 200 Euros per vehicle 
and day.111 As regards the time needed for the customs and police procedures 
within the BCPs, the customs procedures at the BCPs after Croatian entry into 
the EU have been simplified and thus shortened, whereas police inspections are 
more detailed and lengthier than before 2015, resulting in more or less the same 
average time needed to cross the border for trucks – usually 30-45 minutes if 
there are no problems detected. Some of the routine customs and police proce-
dures are done simultaneously and last around 30 minutes, including truck scal-
ing, physical inspection and mandatory heartbeat detector inspection for sealed 
vehicles (lasting around 15 minutes). If a truck is subjected to the RTG scanning, 
this usually takes another 15-20 minutes.112 However, if there is an extraordinary 
event, such as detection of illegal migrants inside the vehicle, the procedure for 
the truck in question can last for 3-4 hours and might stall all the other trucks 
waiting behind it if it does not get pulled alongside, which cases are not rare.113 
That is probably caused by shortage of manpower in police forces, which cannot 
deal with the migrant incident and the subsequent procedures and at the same 
time perform inspections of other vehicles.
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement regarding work organisation 
at the BCPs, as all trucks have to wait together at all the BCPs in long queues, 
whether being empty or laden, or operating within the EU or in international 
transport. They all lose time and money, although there are substantial differ-
ences between them. The haulers operating only within the EU have no sealed 
cargo space, same as the haulers on return voyages with empty trucks. They can 
110 During the migrant crisis, the EU had allowed some Member States, which were at the 
forefront of migrant waves, to keep their internal border checking (e.g. Austria, Germany, 
and Italy). See Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/818 of 11 May 2017 setting out 
a Recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional cir-
cumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, OJ (2017) L 122, 
p. 73.
111 Dimitrijević, A., Kontrole na Bregani sve veći gospodarski problem: dnevno se gubi na 
tisuće eura, at https://vijesti.rtl.hr/novosti/hrvatska/2666941/kontrola-bregana-kamioni-
gospodarstvo/ (20.9.2018). Also: Mandić, Neđo, video TIL conference, supra note 83.
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hence easily open the cargo space for physical inspection by the police, mak-
ing the whole procedure last for only a couple of minutes. On the other hand, 
the haulers in international transport have sealed cargo space, and have to be 
subjected to more sophisticated methods of the detection of the interior of that 
space, as elaborated supra. That is a much more time-consuming procedure, in-
volving possible resealing of trucks, issuing new transport documentation, the 
RTG scanning, etc. Due to the differences between the two categories of haulers, 
it would be extremely useful to open separate lanes at the BCPs between Croatia 
and other EU countries: one for the EU operators and empty trucks, and the 
other for non-EU operators with laden and sealed trucks. Thereby, the passage 
for the former category would be substantially fastened, and the loss of time and 
money avoided.
A further very important factor affecting the time needed to cross borders is 
the EU social legislation in road114 and rail transport115 that sets stringent rules 
on mandatory rest and drive periods for the drivers and the crew. During rest 
time, the truck has to remain absolutely immobile, which gets recorded by the 
tachograph116, and is subject to later police inspections. Therefore, the truck 
driver waiting in front of the border crossing, whose rest time is due, has to 
remain immobile throughout this time and stop moving the vehicle towards 
the border, otherwise risking to be fined by the police during the following 28 
days, in which logs have to be kept. If he has less than two hours working time 
left, he is not allowed to approach the BCP and enter within the restricted area. 
The loss of time for him to only cross the border amounts to more than 10 hours, 
114 See Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport 
and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1.; 
Directive 2002/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 on 
the organisation of the working time of persons performing mobile road transport activi-
ties, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 35.
115 Council Directive 2005/47/EC lays down working conditions for mobile workers engaged 
in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector (Council Directive 2005/47/EC 
of 18 July 2005 on the Agreement between the Community of European Railways (CER) 
and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) on certain aspects of the work-
ing conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the 
railway sector, OJ L 195, 27.7.2005, p. 15).
116 A tachograph is a device that records the driving time, breaks, rest periods, and periods 
of other work undertaken by a driver. Council Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 on recording 
equipment in road transport provides the basis for the tachograph, but it also introduces 
the ‘’smart tachograph’’, which will be installed in vehicles registered for the first time as 
of 15 June 2019.
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not including the previous waiting time. In railway transport, the problem is 
similar: during waiting time at the BCP, the working hours of the crew can be 
over, forcing them to take the daily rest of 8 hours before continuing the voy-
age, even though the passage for the train had been cleared by the police and 
the train path might be secured. Idle time spent at the BCPs comes at a high 
cost too. According to Serbian Association of International Road Haulers, out 
of 22 working days, a driver working in the region spends as much as 7 days 
at border crossings. Due to this, the overall number of kilometres passed by a 
driver in the EU is 150,000, compared to 75,000-95,000 passed by a driver work-
ing on routes involving non-EU countries.117 This problem is particularly evident 
in non-EU countries hit by the migrant crisis. Those numbers mean as much as 
50% less efficiency of the driver and his operator, which amounts to 50% less 
income, which in turn means much lower salaries for the drivers in the region. 
Therefore, there is no surprise that they are massively leaving to work in Ger-
many and other EU countries within Schengen area, causing an alarming short-
age of qualified drivers in road haulage industry in Croatia and other, non-EU 
countries, in the region. All the mentioned problems affect the countries along 
the Balkan and East Mediterranean routes, as well as road and rail operators 
working along these corridors. They are being slowed down and losing money, 
leaving the state with less taxes and lower import-export rate, as well as lower 
competitiveness of the transport industries. The consignees will inevitably try 
to avoid the transport corridors affected by the migrant crisis, opting for faster, 
although longer and more expensive alternative routes, but with smooth trans-
port flows and predictable transport times. 
6. CONCLUSION
The unprecedented trend of irregular migrations towards the EU is far from 
over. Although it might seem that these migrations are spontaneous and very 
elemental in their organisation, there is often some arrangement involved to 
provide highly paid services for migrants during their voyage, linking them 
directly to human smuggling. One of the longest migration routes in this part 
of the world involves the Western Balkan route and the Eastern Mediterrane-
an route, both going through Croatian territory, which is still not a part of the 
Schengen area. The Balkan route is an already established route for other forms 
of organised crime, with established criminal networks and logistics in the area 
117 Mandić, N., president of the Serbian Association of International Road Haulers, TIL Con-
ference video supra note 83.
139
N. Radionov; I. Savić, The Impact of Irregular Migrations, Smuggling and Human Trafficking on the Land 
Transport Industry: The Croatian Case, PPP god. 58 (2019), 173, str. 103-149
in search for new and easier opportunities, which they found in human smug-
gling and the THB. The latter crimes have lower penalties and (at least at the 
beginning of migrations) milder law enforcement than drug trafficking crimes, 
which fact has added to their appeal. The data of ten thousand missing chil-
dren and women during migration through Croatia during the peak period of 
2015-2016, with many reports of rapes and sexual abuse of the same vulnerable 
group (and many more unreported cases) indicates that there is also a strong 
link between irregular migrations, smuggling and the THB. There are no clear 
distinctions or lines to be drawn among the three crimes during the period of 
migration through Croatia as primarily a transit country. All of them, however, 
have a strong link to and exercise an impact on transport industry in the region.
The number of clandestine entries at the BCPs detected in the EU increased 
by 85% between 2009 and 2017, with the peak between 2014 and 2015, declining 
in 2016-17. However, due to the closed Hungarian border with Serbia, the migra-
tion flows diverted towards the Serbian-Croatian border after 2015, making a 
strong pressure on two BCPs in the region: Batrovci-Bajakovo and Šid-Tovarnik, 
where trucks and trains are used for clandestine entries.
The steep rise in the number of clandestine entries was detected at Croatian 
BCPs between 2016 (80) and 2017 (448)118, pointing towards land transport vehi-
cles and the BCPs as points for irregular entry, opposed to previous migrations 
along the green and blue border. The reason for this can be found in stronger 
and technically more advanced control of the latter part of the border from 2014 
on, when at the same time the BCPs, especially with respect to railway trans-
port, were technically and technologically functioning in pretty much the same 
way as in time when there was no state border between the two states, mak-
ing the clandestine entry and transport in train wagons fairly easy. Faced with 
strong pressure of irregular migrations at its eastern BCPs, the practice of only 
joint inspection of train compositions at the Serbian BCP in Šid by the crew of 
two train operators was abandoned, and a new Croatian BCP in Tovarnik was 
established, with a full range of police and customs procedures. Incidents with 
attempted clandestine entries by trains were very common from 2016 on. The 
industry was – and still is – lamenting about it as a tremendous problem in its 
everyday performance, but is unwilling to disclose any details on the extent 
thereof or the precise figures involved.
The research has shown that there is apparently no sophisticated technical 
equipment used for the inspection of trains entering Croatia (and the EU), com-
118 Izvješće o radu carinske uprave za 2017. godinu, supra note 55, p. 26.
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pared to those used on trucks at the BCPs. The physical inspection of all wag-
ons with breaking seals on laden wagons in the whole composition remains the 
main and only method used, as well as (occasionally) unloading and reloading 
wagons full of suspicious cargo, where migrants might be hidden. New police 
instructions as to the stowing of certain types of cargo in wagons, e.g. timber 
and boxes, leaving empty passages between piles, make the cargo exposed to 
damage during transport and increase a carrier’s exposure to damage. Notwith-
standing its efficiency, physical inspection as the primary security method in 
combating crime has numerous negative impacts on railway industry in the re-
gion. The physical inspection of entire train compositions, sometimes involving 
unloading and reloading of wagons full of cargo, resealing of wagons and filling 
out transport documents prolongs the time needed for crossing the Croatian 
border for trains compared to the period before 2015 for 30 minutes in average. 
However, the average total time needed for crossing the border before was 30 
minutes, whereas now, it can be between 40 minutes and a couple of hours. The 
time often depends on the kind of cargo carried, as well as on the problems in-
curring to the previous train detained at the border. Such oscillations, combined 
with problem of work and rest time for the crew, make it hard for the operator 
to plan the timetable of the train and procure the train path. The delays at this 
border, therefore, incur further delays in the continuation of transport through 
other countries (the availability of locomotive, crew and train path if the ones 
originally planned were lost due to the delay), making the choice of the railway 
transport in the region far less attractive than before. The persisting problem 
of cargo thefts, combined with the recent problem of illegal migrants in rail-
way transport, has led to the introduction of a new security measure in railway 
transport – the outsourcing of security agencies providing physical protection 
to trains and their cargo. It seems that armed guards are spreading through 
air and sea transport to land transport as well, but for reasons different from 
those in the former modes of transport. The initial experiences by the Serbian 
railway carrier are extremely positive – in the first six months of their employ-
ment, the number of thefts and migrant incidents have been brought to zero. It 
is unclear whether they are physically accompanying the train throughout its 
voyage through a particular country or whether they are located at certain train 
stations and border stations, where there is a higher risk of these types of crime. 
In the former case, particular problem is the accommodation of armed guards 
on freight trains that would respect labour rights of guards around the clock, 
as well as enable them to physically secure the train composition outside the 
area of train stations. Further research and monitoring of this phenomenon is 
needed, as some operators in the region are contemplating introducing the same 
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measure, whereas others are not. The reported cases of migrants discovered 
within the originally sealed wagons in Croatia suggest possible involvement, ei-
ther voluntary or involuntary, of a consignor’s or an operator’s crew present dur-
ing loading and sealing at the place of origin in another country, which might 
be an indication of the possible creation of opportunistic smuggling networks 
outside the original criminal milieu. However, the same occurrence might be 
caused by long periods needed for loading a train composition, where sealing 
all of the wagons occurs at the end of the loading process, enabling migrants to 
hide within the cargo of previously loaded wagons without any help from the 
outside. These being only indications, there is need for further research regard-
ing this point, as well as future experiences regarding armed guards in railway 
transport. This research has shown, though, that the physical inspection of train 
compositions at borders as the only security measure combating irregular mi-
grations and smuggling is insufficient and time-consuming, heavily hindering 
the normal reeling of railway transport in the region and causing further loss of 
its competitiveness. This may hardly be overcome alone by the industry, which 
is already struggling with other problems.
Given the fact that the EU funds for the protection of the long EU border in 
Croatia are highly available at this stage of its accession to the Schengen area, 
it would be recommended to supply and include advanced scanning technolo-
gies, such as the RTG and infrared scanners, to railway transport as well. Road 
freight transport, on the other hand, is also heavily stroke by long delays due to 
new and sophisticated police inspections at the BCPs, especially along the Xth 
corridor. Besides the pre-existing inspection procedures, new scanners intro-
duced after 2016 (after the peak of the migrations in the region had already been 
over) include mandatory use of heartbeat detectors (adding minimum 15 min in-
spection time per truck), as well as the RTG and CO2 detectors, unsealing trucks 
for physical inspection, etc. The average prolongation of time spent per truck at 
the BCPs for regular inspection is around 30 min, yet the overall waiting time 
(especially at the Croatian-Serbian border) can amount to over 20 hours, leading 
to the fact that for the transport route of one day, three working days are lost 
(including the empty return voyage). Police security measures applied to road 
haulage industry are effective though slow, but the transport safety measures of 
weighing (axle pressure and overall weight) cannot be used for the detection of 
illegal migrants due to allowed oscillations. Haulage industry engaged in inter-
national transport between the EU and non-EU countries in the region is rapidly 
losing competitiveness due to the fact that approximately one third of working 
days are lost on idle waiting time at the BCPs. This cannot be charged to the 
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consignor, which finally results in a smaller profit and the loss of skilled drivers 
moving to work within the Single Market.
The organisation of police work at the BCPs leaves room for improvement, 
too. Presently both laden and empty trucks, as well as the EU and non-EU trans-
port operations (going from Croatia westwards) are waiting in a single line for 
inspection, although empty trucks and containers are subjected only to physi-
cal inspection, which is a lot faster than respective procedures for laden trucks. 
Introducing separate lanes for these two categories would greatly improve the 
flow of road freight transport and lead to the enhanced competitiveness of 
transport industry in the region, leading in turn to a higher export-import rate 
of the countries in the region. Finally, due to the stringent police inspections 
of both railway and road transport at the Croatian BCPs along the Xth corridor, 
the migration flows in 2018 have diverted from the Western Balkan to the East-
ern Mediterranean route, with larger groups of migrants concentrating along 
the western border of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia, near the towns of 
Cazin and Bihać, where there is a thin part of Croatian territory of only 70 km 
between the Bosnian and Slovenian border. The attempts to cross this green and 
blue border over dangerous mountain route will inevitably close with the arrival 
of harsh winter, steering migrants inevitably more towards clandestine entries 
by trucks at the BCPs in the region. The nearest railway BCP of Volinja is rarely 
used, so the possibility of clandestine entries by trains can be expected at the 
BCPs in the northern part of the Bosnian border. Faced with smaller, but still on-
going irregular migrations in the region counting tens of thousands of persons, 
Croatia’s ambition to enter the Schengen area by the end of 2018 remains highly 
questionable. On the other hand, strengthening police procedures at the eastern 
EU borders at Croatian BCPs do yield results in combating irregular migrations, 
but leave disastrous consequences to land freight transport industry along the 
Xth corridor, with unforeseen effects for the economy of the states in the region. 
It would therefore be of utmost importance for all the stakeholders involved to 
further study these phenomena and improve some of the procedures and pro-
cesses of the police, the customs and the operators, to everyone’s benefit.
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UTJECAJ IREGULARNIH MIGRACIJA, KRIJUMČARENJA I TRGOVANJA 
LJUDIMA NA KOPNENU TRANSPORTNU INDUSTRIJU: 
SLUČAJ HRVATSKE
Velika migrantska kriza, koja se zadnjih nekoliko godina prelijeva preko cijele Europe, 
ostavila je traga i na Hrvatsku. Relativno mala država u jugoistočnoj Europi koja leži 
na dva važna transportna koridora – paneuropskim koridorima Xa i Vb, našla se tako i 
na dva velika migrantska koridora: zapadno-balkanskom i mediteranskom koridoru. Po-
sljedica toga najbolje se ogleda u činjenici da je preko Hrvatske u samo zadnjih nekoliko 
godina prešlo više od pola milijuna ljudi (i evidentirano preko 20 000 ilegalnih migrana-
ta), koji su često pronađeni skriveni u kamionima i vlakovima na graničnim prijelazima 
između Republike Hrvatske i Srbije, Bosne i Hercegovine, ili Mađarske.
Ovaj rad bavi se pitanjima utjecaja ovog fenomena na transportnu industriju, a pose-
bice na teretni prijevoz kopnom, kako u Hrvatskoj tako i u cijeloj regiji JI Europe. U tom 
smislu, u radu su analizirani regionalni trendovi iregularnih migracija na ovom područ-
ju koji su dovedeni u vezu s uvođenjem novih sigurnosnih mjera (u okviru graničnog 
pregleda kamiona i vlakova) od strane policije i sveukupnom izvedbom pružanja usluga 
cestovnog i željezničkog prijevoza (robe) u ova osjetljiva vremena.
Ključne riječi: iregularne migracije; krijumčarenje; cestovni prijevoz; željeznički 
prijevoz; neovlašteni prelazak granice; skeneri; balkanska ruta; euro-mediteranska ruta; 
granični prijelazi; Šengen; policijske inspekcije; sigurnosne mjere u prometu; mjere za-
štite u prometu.
